I propose to indicate a class of choice-situations in which many otherwise reasonable people neither wish nor tend to conform to the Savage postulates, nor to the other axiom sets that have been devised. But the implications of such a finding, if true, are not wholly destructive. First, both the predictive and normative use of the Savage or equivalent postulates might be improved by avoiding attempts to apply them in certain, specifiable circumstances where they do not seem acceptable. Second, we might hope that it is precisely in such circumstances that certain proposals for alternative decision rules and nonprobabilistic descriptions of uncertainty (e.g., by Knight, Shackle, Hurwicz, and Hodges and L mann) might prove fruitful. I believe, in fact, that this is the case. ' Let me introduce myself as one who accepts Savage's postulates or equivalent rules for a much wider domain of problems than does either Ellsberg or Fellner. In particular, I find that I would want to behave in a manner consistent with Savage's normative prescriptions of behavior in the examples cited by the above authors. At the outset I will agree with them that it is not hard to elicit from most people (and I include myself in this category) a set of mutually inconsistent responses to questions or to observe in their actions inconsistent behavior. But I wish to reaffirm, what these authors also emphasize, that Savage's theory is not a descriptive or predictive theory of behavior. It is a theory which purports to advise any one of its believers how he should behave in complicated situations, provided he can make choices in a coherent manner in relatively simple, uncomplicated situations.
The fact that most people can be shown to be inconsistent in their manifest choice behavior cuts two ways: First, it emphasizes the difficulties encountered in putting into practice a model which demands in each application that the decision-maker assign a set of preferences to a host of simple problems which are internally consistent. Second, it clearly demonstrates how important it is to have a theory which can be used to aid in the making of decisions under uncertainty. If most people behaved in a manner roughly consistent with Savage's theory then the theory would gain stature as a descrip- Several years ago, Ellsberg tested some of his observations on me. As an experimental subject I was hopelessly contaminated because I had already thought hard about the discussion in Jimmy Savage's book on the Allais Paradox. My immediate impulse was to break apart some of the options he asked me to consider into simpler components and then to force internal consistency on myself by means of the Savage model. But as Ellsberg pointed out, this was not playing his game and he asked me for a reply to his questions without any pencil pushing. I complied and I was found wanting. I started to experiment on my own with adaptations of Ellsberg's counter-intuitive examples. My subjects were students at the Harvard Business School and a few seasoned business executives -"men of experience." Immediately I observed what I shall call the "two-shift-effect." I found that when relative frequencies or so-called objective probabilities were given in numerical form as data of a decision problem, then these were often used in computing various indices (e.g., expected or actuarial values) which served as a guide to action. But if certain uncertainties in the problem were in cloudy or fuzzy form, then very often there was a shifting of gears and no effort at all was made to think deliberately and reflectively about the problem. Systematic decomposition of the problem was shunned and an over-all "seat of the pants" judgment was made which usually graphically reflected the temperament of the decision-maker. (I refer here to the pessimism-optimism polarity.) In reporting this, of Shackle, Knight, etc.). However, I draw a different message from this experience. There is a need to teach people how to cope with uncertainty in a purposive and reflective manner, and to break down the taboo that probabilities should only be assigned if one has clearcut relative frequency data at hand. As one step toward making this view more palatable I have regularly used in my classes the following adaptation of one of Ellsberg's thought-provoking problems.
I believe the following questionnaire (two questions plus the brief preamble) should be clear enough. You might enjoy trying this yourself now. In the classroom I usually emphasize the fact that "You," the subject, have complete freedom of calling "red" or "black" in both of the questions below. There is not only division of opinion but opinions do not change easily. But then someone -all too often that someone is I -comes up with the following argument: Suppose you withdraw a ball from the urn with unknown composition but do not look at its color. Now toss a fair (unbiased) coin and call "red" if heads, "black" if tails.
The "objective" probability of getting a match is now .5 and therefore it is just as desirable to participate in the second game as in the first. I have found out that after the student convinces himself it does not matter whether the ball is drawn first or whether the coin is tossed first, that he is most willing to increase his price for the second game up to the price he was willing to pay in the first game. Incidentally, I tried this same experiment on a graduate class in statistics in which all the students had prior courses in mathematical statistics and the pattern of answers, as well as the ensuing free-for-all discussion, was very much like the experiences I had with business school students who had had no previous courses in statistics. anyone could refute the logic leading to the conclusion that given your initial choices, you should prefer option A to option B. This bit of logic is certainly not the weak link in the argument. But then again these options look awfully alike to me! Therefore, on thinking it over, wouldn't you like to change your mind about your initial preferences?
